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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 22/07/2011 Accident number: 790 
Accident time: 11:55 Accident Date: 06/12/2007 
Where it occurred: AF/0112/00168, MF 
0231, Shinwari Village, 
Sorobi District, Kabul 
Province 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Victim inattention (?) 
Class: Missed-mine accident Date of main report: None 
ID original source: (37) Name of source: UNMACCA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: AP blast (unrecorded) Ground condition: metal fragments 
rocks/stones 
steep slope 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 22/07/2011 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
inadequate area marking (?) 
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 




The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons 
Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting 
being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more 
information becomes available. 
The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
 
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF DEMINING ACCIDENT involving [Demining group] 
DT# 01 ON 06 DECEMBER 2007  
INTRODUCTION: 
A Board of Inquiry (BOI) was convened by Program Director of UNMACA to investigate the 
fatal demining accident involving [the Victim] a deminer from [Demining group] DT # 01. The 
accident occurred at 11:55 hours on 06 December 2007 at task # AF/0112/00168/MF 0231 
located in Shinwari Village, Sorobi District of Kabul Province. 
SUMMARY: 
The area was mined in 1997 by the Russians whose convoys were being attacked by 
Mujahideen as they travelled through Sorobi Pass. The clearance task is confirmed by LIAT 
as a High mine impacted area. A total of 21 mine accidents have been recorded in this area 
of which 4 accidents have occurred during the current year. 
The deminer was working on a steep, sloping area of a mountain that was known to contain 
anti-personnel mines.  The clearance was made difficult due to the gradient of the slope 
(approx 45 degrees), the loose nature of the rock and the number of metal fragments in the 
area.   
After the routine break at 1140 – 1150 hrs, the deminer was advised by his Section Leader 
(SL) to mark his lane clearly so that the SL could conduct his own QC checks.  Just prior to 
the detonation the deminer was observed by the SL and another deminer to be preparing 
paint for the painting of rocks (for the next week).  At 1155 the deminer stepped onto an anti-
personnel mine with his left foot while in the squatting position.  The deminer then rolled down 
the steep slope to his final resting place in a previously cleared area.  On the way down the 
slope the deminer lost his helmet and woollen hat and sustained some facial injuries.  
The team reacted as per SOPs and the CASEVAC procedure was performed, treatment was 
given and the victim was then moved to the ambulance and transported to the hospital in 
Kabul. Unfortunately in spite of extensive surgery and treatment the deminer died at the 
hospital the following day at 8:00 am. 
Some of the stones used for marking the clearance lane had migrated down the slope from 
the accident site during the blast and were visible to the BOI during their inspection. 
CONCLUSIONS: 
It is the BOI conclusion that the deminer had missed a mine during the morning’s clearance.  
He was not clearly marking his lane progressively throughout the course of the day and he 
inadvertently stepped on this mine, receiving extensive blast injuries that resulted in his death.  
RECOMMENDATIONS:  
The following points are to be considered by all clearance organisations in the MAPA: 
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• A more rigorous permanent marking system should be employed in clearance 
operations that are located on steep sloping ground where there is a danger that the 
marking could move i.e. steel pegs/stakes and ropes should be used not rocks. 
• Full PPE shall be worn correctly at all times in a hazard area. 
• All organisations are reminded that they shall inform UNMACA when making any 
variations to the organisations SOPs.  This is so that an assessment can be made of 
the proposed changes before permission is granted to change SOPs. 
• The team leader and section leader should both be given formal warnings for not 
ensuring their team members were adhering to SOPs by clearly marking the lane as 
they progressed into the hazard. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 980 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: DECEASED 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frontal apron 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES: severe Face 
AMPUTATION/LOSS: Leg Below knee 
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. ". . . extensive blast injuries that resulted 
in his death . . . the deminer died at the hospital the following day at 8:00 am". 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the Victim 
was working improperly having missed a mine and failed to mark his working area 
appropriately and the errors were not corrected in a timely manner. It also seems likely that 
the Victim was working without wearing a visor because the investigators’ recommendations 
include “Full PPE shall be worn correctly at all times in a hazard area”. The secondary cause 
is listed as Victim inattention because the Victim stepped on a mine he had failed to locate 
during his work (unless the marking was so inadequate that he was actually outside the area 
he had cleared without knowing that he was). 
The Victim stepped on a mine while squatting and may have suffered severe thigh, buttock or 
groin injury as well because the point of initiation would have been behind his blast armour. If 
he did, it is likely that the facial injuries were caused by the subsequent fall down the hillside 
rather than the blast. 
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident 
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years, 
so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. It is noteworthy that the Afghan national staff have 
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been more responsible over sharing data than those internationals who presume greater 
responsibility. 
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